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After looking at the security literature, you will find 
secrecy is formafo;o;ed in different ways, depending on 
the application. Applications have threat models that 
influence our choice of secrecy properties. A property 
may be reasonable in one cont.ext and completely un-
satisfactory in another if other threats exist. 
The primary goal of this panel is to foster discussion 
on 'vhat sorts of secrecy properties arc appropriate for 
different applications and to investigate what they have 
in common. \Ve also 'vant. to explore what is meant by 
secrecy in different contexts. Perhaps there is enough 
overlap among our threat models that we can begin to 
identify some key secrecy properties for 'vidcr appli-
cation. Currently, secrecy is treated in rather ad hoc 
ways. \Vith some agreement. among calculi for express-
ing protocols and systems, 've might even be able to 
use one another's proof techniques for proving secrecy! 
Four experts \Vere invited as panelists. Two pan-
elists, Riccardo Focardi and :tvlartfn Abadi, represent 
formalbmtions of secrecy as demanded by secure sys-
tems that aim to prohibit various channels, or insecure 
information flmvs. }fore specifically, they represent 
noninterference-based secrecy. The other two panelists, 
Cathy :tvleadows and .Jon l\Iillen, represent formaliza-
tions of secrecy for protocols based on the Dolev-Yao 
threat model [2]. Belmv arc some specific questions 
that 'vcrc asked of each of the panelists: 
1. Secrecy is sometimes formulated as a "safety" 
property in protocol analysis where one is con-
cerned 'vith whether an intruder learns a specific 
value (a secret). Such a criterion is inadequate for 
guaranteeing secure information flow in systems 
where secrets can ahvays be encoded or transmit-
ted in covert ways. Leaks arising by indirect fiows 
from within a process executing a protocol seem 
as dangerous as those caused by message exchange 
with an adversary. This is especially true of crypto 
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protocols whose implementations normally admit 
cryptanalytic attacks. So why does protocol anal-
ysis adopt a different criterion? 
2. Is there a secrecy property for protocols and sys-
tems'? Is it noninterference (='JI) based'? One key 
problem is encryption. It blows NI-based formu-
lations apart. Hmv can 'vc cope with it"? Do we 
assume perfect encryption and fiddle with notions 
of equivalence until 've get the "desired effect"'? 
Or do we use techniques that are more sensitive 
to the computational complexity of compromising 
secrets'? 
3. Can we study protocol secrecy within the same 
framework as that used for information flow in a 
concurrent setting? If not, why? 
4. Suppose l\fallory imitates Bob in a key establish-
ment protocol \vith Alice, to get Alice to accept a 
key that lVlallory knows. Is this a failure of secrecy 
because Alice incorrectly believes that the key is 
known only to Bob and herself'? 
Panelists were asked to try to respond to these ques-
tions or provide questions that they feel arc more ap-
propriate. Their responses are given in the following 
sections. Thanks to the panelists for participating. 
1. Martin Abadi's Reply 
Suppose that we 'vish to require that a protocol pre-
serve the secrecy of one of its parameters, :i:. The 
protocol should not leak any information about :r-
in other words, the value of x should not interfere with 
the behavior of the protocol that the environment can 
observe. The parameter x may denote the identity of 
one of the participants or the sensitive data that is 
sent encrypted aft.er a key exchange. In general, we 
cannot express this secrecy property as a predicate on 
behaviors. On the other hand, representing the pro-
tocol as a process P(x), \Ve may express the secrecy 
property by saying that P(Al) and P(N) a.re equiv-
alent (or indistinguishable), for all possible values JV! 
and N for :r:. Here we say that t.\vO processes P1 and P 2 
are equivalent. when no third process Q can distinguish 
running in parallel with P 1 from running in parallel in 
P'2. This notion of process equivalence (testing equiv-
alence) has been applied to several classes of processes 
and \Vith several concepts of dist.inguishability, some-
times accounting for cryptographic operations. 
Approaches based on predicates on behaviors rely 
on a rather different. definition of secrecy, which can be 
traced back to the influential work of Dolev and Yao. 
According to tha.t definition, a. process preserves the 
secrecy of a piece of data l\1 if the process never sends 
Al in clear on the network, or anything that would 
permit the computation of JJ1, even in interaction with 
an attacker. 
N cit.her definition of secrecy implies the other. The 
first one concerns a process with a free variable :r;, while 
the second one concerns a. process and a term \Vith no 
free variables. \Vith the first definition, we can sa.y 
that P(x) preserves the secrecy of the value of x even 
when this value may be a boolean; \Vit.h the second 
one, it does not make much sense to talk about a se-
cret boolean. In addition, the first definition rules out 
implicit information flows, while the second one docs 
not. \Vhile the exact relations between the definitions 
remain unclear, I believe that the first one represents a 
more compelling criterion, and that the second one is a 
useful approximation that fits better into some formal 
frameworks. 
2. Riccardo Focardi's Reply 
Non-Interference (NI) has been introduced with the 
aim of formalizing security policies in systems. In par-
ticular, given hvo groups of users .4 and n, the require-
ment ".4 must not interfere \:Vith B" basically imposes 
that wha.t is done by users in .4 cannot modify in any 
\vay the behaviour of the users in B. As a consequence, 
\Ve obtain that the information which is knmvn by users 
in .4 can never be revealed to users belonging to fl. 
This gives us a strong notion of secrecy (in systems). 
For example, through :\TI requirements, \Ve can easily 
formalize a multilevel security policy by requiring that 
users at a certain confidentiality level do not interfere 
with users at a lower level. 
Indeed, :\TI is a general concept that can also be prof-
it.ably applied in other settings, as it simply verifies if 
someone is able to induce a ne\v (potentially danger-
cms) behaviour. As an example, :\TI has already been 
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successfully exploited for the automatic verification of 
cryptographic protocols. Usually, when we consider a 
cryptographic protocol, \Ve would like to be guaran-
teed that no enemy is able to introduce any "undesir-
able behaviours". This is exactly what NI requires. For 
example, for secrecy an "undesirable behaviour" is rep-
resented by the leaking of (secret) information which is 
detectable by simply observing the state of the enemy. 
This reflects the power and the limitations of the 
use of NI-based properties in the analysis of security 
protocols: 
• On one hand, the generality of NI makes it possi-
ble to detect in the same analysis completely dif-
ferent attacks (e.g., secrecy and authentication). 
This could increase the probability of finding ne\v 
attacks, since we do not need to fix in advance the 
specific security property to be checked; 
• On the other hand, this kind of analysis requires 
an additional effort in identifying which a.re the 
"undesirable behaviours", i.e., \vhich of the re-
vealed behaviours are at.tacks and which are not. 
Hmvever, \vhen it is possible to reveal an attack by 
observing fe,v well-defined events, e.g., in secrecy 
analyses, this task becomes trivial. 
Finally, KI seems to be a good unifying approach to 
computer and net.vmrk security. As a matter of fact, 
after the underlying model has been enriched (in some 
way) in order to deal with cryptography, KI can be used 
to analyze protocol secrecy within the same framework 
as that used for information flow in systems. 
3. Cathy Meadows' Reply 
:\fost of the work that has been done on applying 
formal methods to cryptographic protocols has relied 
upon the Dolev-Yao model, in \vhich both intruders 
and honest participants have access to a finite num-
ber of \vell-defined operations obeying a finite set of 
algebraic rules. In this model the secrecy problem re-
duces to the problem of determining whether or not 
an int.ruder can learn a specific word by combining the 
set of operations available to it v.rith the set of oper-
ations performed by the legitimate participants in the 
protocol. This is a very simple notion of secrecy: the 
intruder either learns the \Vord or doesn't. Thus it 
avoids dealing with the quest.ion of whether or not the 
intruder can learn information about a word or key 
tha.t would help in cryptanalysis, whether or not the 
intruder learns relationships between words (for exam-
ple the relationship behveen a message and its sender), 
and whether a conspirator can encode secret informa-
tion in the execution of the protocol. On the other 
hand, the Dolev-Yao model gives the protocol analyst 
a powerful tool for understanding a \vide range of au-
thentication properties that can be guaranteed by a 
cryptographic protocol. 
This is in marked contrast. to the notion of secrecy 
used in information flow, in which it is attempted to 
determine \Vhether one untrusted process H could pass 
information to another untrusted process L by deter-
mining whether or not H has any effect on the system 
that is visible to L. ='Jot only is this a much more subtle 
notion of secrecy than the Dolev-Yao version, relying 
on knowledge of possible as \vell as actual behavior, but 
the trust model is different: in the Dolev-Yao model the 
holders of secrets are trusted, while in the information 
flow model the holder of secrets H is untrusted, and it 
is up to the system to provide the guarantee that H 
does not reveal information. 
Since the models satisfy such different requirements, 
it is difficult to "defend" one against the other. How-
ever, it does make sense to ask how they could be made 
to work together in a system that must satisfy multi-
level security requirements and also engage in authen-
tication protocols. For example, we might. \Vant. to con-
sider a system in \vhich a subject is trusted to engage 
properly in a cryptographic protocol, but may or may 
not be trusted not to leak information via. covert chan-
nels. 
In order to understand hmv the two notions of se-
curity can be made to \Vork together, we may \Vant 
to look at another notion of security for systems: the 
type provided by access control policies. In the access 
control model, as in the Dolev-Yao model, the system 
consists of a set of principals (subjects), some of whom 
may be dishonest, a set of objects, and a finite set of 
operations that may be performed on the objects, such 
as creation, deletion, and the granting and removing of 
access rights. As in the Dolev-Yao model, the notion of 
secrecy is simple; it boils dmvn to determining whether 
or not a subject can gain read access to an object. And, 
also as in the Dolev-Yao model, it is possible to use the 
finite set of operations to model a wide range of access 
control policies and requirements. 
A number of attempts have been made to unify ac-
cess control models with information-flow type models, 
\vith some success. The Bell-Lapadula model was per-
haps the first; it foundered on the question of dmvn-
grading. The ability to downgrade data is necessary, 
but it also violates a straightfoward information flow 
policy, since it is an obvious flow from High to Low. 
Intransitive noninterference policies attempt to rec-
tify thiR Rituation by allowing information to flmv only 
through certain channels, such as downgraders. Other 
\Vork, such as that of Simon Foley [3], has concentrated 
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on developing a framework that allows complex struc-
tures of information flow requirements. 
An approach like the above would allow us to inte-
grate cryptographic protocol analysiR into the informa-
tion fiow model, but at the possible price of ignoring 
information fiow risks that could arise from deliberate 
information leakage during the execution of the proto-
col. For this we might want to look at work that has 
been done in the cryptographic community to address 
this very problem - knmvn as "subliminal channels'' 
in this context [l]. However, this work introduces an 
added expense: the introduction of a trusted \Varden 
to verify the absence of subliminal messages. l\fore-
over, most of the existing work is applicable only to 
7:ero knowledge protocols, which have seen few practial 
applications. However, a closer look at this vmrk may 
give us ideas for applying it to more generally appli-
cable protocols and to integrating it with information 
flow models. 
4. Jon Millen's Reply 
It may seem odd that an apparently primitive con-
cept like "secrecy" could be formalized in Reveral dif-
ferent ways within a single application area such as 
cryptographic protocol analysis. But \Ve already have 
a precedent for a multiplicity of models of secrecy in 
the analysis of secure operating systems. Figures 1 and 
2 shmv the analogy between the t.\vo subjects. It. is Rug-
gested that there is a good reason for having more than 
one model, and that similar reasoning applies to both 
areas. 
The pyramid pictures illustrate the progression from 
simple, basic policies to a more detailed analysis that 
focuses on localized subsystems. The more focused 
analysis requires more detail in the syRtem model. In 
both environments, a really thorough treatment of se-
crecy has to bring in Shannon's information theory, 
which implies probabilistic considerations. 
There is a fundamental difficulty in applying nonin-
terference to encryption, namely the fact that changes 
in plaintext cause changes in ciphertext. In a proba-
bilistic context, one can rephrase secrecy as an inability 
to diRtinguish secret information from randomly gen-
erc~tted text. 
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